Technocratic governments in Italy, often portrayed as caretaker cabinets, have in fact played a pivotal role in reshaping the state. This article systematically analyses the reforms enacted by four technocratic cabinets–those of Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, Lamberto Dini, Mario Monti, and Mario Draghi–between 1993 and 2022. Combining a longitudinal design with in-depth policy analysis, it examines administrative and welfare reforms across three dimensions: domain, scope, and policy orientation. The findings challenge the conventional view of technocracy as an exceptional response to crisis, showing instead that these executives have contributed to recurring patterns of state restructuring. While neoliberal and managerial orientations prevail across all cases, important variations in the scope of reform and in contextual conditions emerge. The analysis avoids deterministic interpretations by situating technocratic agency within the interplay between structural constraints and strategic intervention. Critical junctures–marked by uncertainty and external pressure–are shown to provide opportunities for technocratic actors to implement high-impact reforms with lasting implications. The article concludes that technocracy has become a normalized mode of policy intervention in Italy, particularly effective for advancing politically costly reforms under crisis conditions. These findings have broader implications for understanding the evolution of democratic governance.
From care-taker" to change-maker? A systematic analysis of the policies of Italian technocratic executives
Cozzolino, Adriano;Carbone, Fabio;Giannone, Diego
2025
Abstract
Technocratic governments in Italy, often portrayed as caretaker cabinets, have in fact played a pivotal role in reshaping the state. This article systematically analyses the reforms enacted by four technocratic cabinets–those of Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, Lamberto Dini, Mario Monti, and Mario Draghi–between 1993 and 2022. Combining a longitudinal design with in-depth policy analysis, it examines administrative and welfare reforms across three dimensions: domain, scope, and policy orientation. The findings challenge the conventional view of technocracy as an exceptional response to crisis, showing instead that these executives have contributed to recurring patterns of state restructuring. While neoliberal and managerial orientations prevail across all cases, important variations in the scope of reform and in contextual conditions emerge. The analysis avoids deterministic interpretations by situating technocratic agency within the interplay between structural constraints and strategic intervention. Critical junctures–marked by uncertainty and external pressure–are shown to provide opportunities for technocratic actors to implement high-impact reforms with lasting implications. The article concludes that technocracy has become a normalized mode of policy intervention in Italy, particularly effective for advancing politically costly reforms under crisis conditions. These findings have broader implications for understanding the evolution of democratic governance.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.


