In recent years, the topic of rules has reappeared forcefully at the centre of debate in various fields of knowledge, probably also as a reaction to the phenomenon of non-compliance with rules. While it is true that no complex organisation can exist without relying on an apparatusof rules, be they legal or social, on the other hand rules often become a ballast and a brake for organisations. This article describes, through the use of Rational Choice Theory, some aspects of the peculiar dynamic between costs and benefits associated with belonging to a social group or complex organisation. In particular, the attempt is to model this dynamic or, at least, to provide some initial indications in this direction, useful for further research.
Organisations’ Pillar or Ballast? A Rational Choice Approach to Rules
Angelo Volpe
2024
Abstract
In recent years, the topic of rules has reappeared forcefully at the centre of debate in various fields of knowledge, probably also as a reaction to the phenomenon of non-compliance with rules. While it is true that no complex organisation can exist without relying on an apparatusof rules, be they legal or social, on the other hand rules often become a ballast and a brake for organisations. This article describes, through the use of Rational Choice Theory, some aspects of the peculiar dynamic between costs and benefits associated with belonging to a social group or complex organisation. In particular, the attempt is to model this dynamic or, at least, to provide some initial indications in this direction, useful for further research.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
