ROMANIELLO, Maria
ROMANIELLO, Maria
Dipartimento di Economia
A Dynamic Game of Coalition Formation under Ambiguity
2011 DE MARCO, G; Romaniello, Maria
A Limit Theorem for Equilibria under Ambiguous Beliefs Correspondences
2013 DE MARCO, G; Romaniello, Maria
A Note on Groups with Many Almost Normal Subgroups
2002 Buono, I; Romaniello, Maria
Beliefs correspondences and equilibria in ambiguous games
2012 DE MARCO, G; Romaniello, Maria
Duality and Perturbations for Nash Equilibria with Constraints
2002 Romaniello, Maria
Duality and Perturbations for Nash Equilibria with Coupled Constraints
2001 Romaniello, Maria
Dynamics of Mixed Coalitions under Social Cohesion Constraints
2006 DE MARCO, G; Romaniello, Maria
Evolution of Coalition Structures under Uncertainty
2008 DE MARCO, Giuseppe; Romaniello, Maria
Existence and Optimality of Cost Share Equilibria
2021 Gabriella Graziano, Maria; Pesce, Marialaura; Romaniello, Maria
Games, Equilibria and the Variational Representation of Preferences
2013 DE MARCO, G; Romaniello, Maria
Generalized Quasi-Variational Iinequalities and Duality
2003 Morgan, J; Romaniello, Maria
GENERALIZED QUASI-VARIATIONAL INEQUALITIES: DUALITY UNDER PERTURBATIONS
2006 Morgan, J; Romaniello, Maria
Linear cost share equilibria and the veto power of the grand coalition
2012 Graziano, M. G.; Romaniello, Maria
On games and equilibria with coherent lower expectations
2015 De Marco, Giuseppe; Romaniello, Maria
On Hurwicz preferences in psychological games
2022 De Marco, Giuseppe; Romaniello, Maria; Roviello, Alba
On Hurwicz Preferences in Psychological Games
2024 De Marco, Giuseppe; Romaniello, Maria; Alba Roviello, And
On the Dynamics of Coalition Structure Beliefs
2011 DE MARCO, G; Romaniello, Maria
On the Stability of Equilibria in Incomplete Information Games under Ambiguity
2013 DE MARCO, G; Romaniello, Maria
Psychological Nash Equilibria under Ambiguity
2021 De Marco, Giuseppe; Romaniello, Maria; Roviello, Alba
Psychological Nash equilibria under ambiguity
2022 De Marco, G.; Romaniello, M.; Roviello, A.