L’embrione umano tra res e “persona”. Spunti dal dibattito giuridico antico e contemporaneo

The ontological human embryo statement leads me to reflect on the theme of the person in relation to the figure of the unborn child, a theme that actually touches the raw nerve of the contemporary debate on human rights. It seems incredible but it is still difficult to say exactly what is a person and what is a human embryo. One reason for the delay in a correct definition of these concepts is certainly that the former has had to deal with, in the West at least two major anthropological mutations which covered the true idea of human beings. Primarily the notion of the person built on the basis of the Aristotelian principle of non-contradiction (with Roman law and theology of the Nicene fathers) and the subsequent discovery of the notion of the individual (principium individuationis) by medieval scholastics (with Boethius, Thomas and Duns Scotus). Then the modern notion of the individual as a bare unit according to Hegel. My work will aim to provide a definition of the human embryo in both a historical and a legal perspective by comparing the theological, religious, philosophical and scientific inquiry to arrive at a definition of an epistemological status (res or person?) that it is a useful utility for the current legal framework.