The paper considers a simple oligopoly model where firms know their own and the average pay-off in the industry. Firms choose decision rules for trading. The theory predicts that there are three types of Nash-equilibria in this game (Collusive, Cournot and Stackelberg). Our experiments test the selection process. We find that there is clear evidence of convergence to an equilibrium, and whilst both Cournot and Collusive outcomes were selected, the Collusive equilibrium is more common. The experimental results give also insights on the process of individual learning, confirming that subjects follow aspiration rules rather than reinforcement rules.

Learning and Evolution with a Known Average: an Application to Oligopoly

SBRIGLIA, Patrizia
1996

Abstract

The paper considers a simple oligopoly model where firms know their own and the average pay-off in the industry. Firms choose decision rules for trading. The theory predicts that there are three types of Nash-equilibria in this game (Collusive, Cournot and Stackelberg). Our experiments test the selection process. We find that there is clear evidence of convergence to an equilibrium, and whilst both Cournot and Collusive outcomes were selected, the Collusive equilibrium is more common. The experimental results give also insights on the process of individual learning, confirming that subjects follow aspiration rules rather than reinforcement rules.
Sbriglia, Patrizia
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/11591/330629
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