The importance of information on behaviour in oligopoly is well established in the theoretical and empirical industrial economics literature. In this paper we provide an experimental test of a Bertrand model, where firms move sequentially and the informational setting varies across different designs. Our experiment is composed of three treatments. In addition to demand and costs parameters, in the second and third treatments, subjects are also informed on the behaviour of players who are not directly operating in their own market. We find that the informational setting strongly affects behaviour and long run convergence to the market equilibrium.

Second Mover Advantage and Dynamic Bertrand Competition: An Experiment

SBRIGLIA, Patrizia;
2010

Abstract

The importance of information on behaviour in oligopoly is well established in the theoretical and empirical industrial economics literature. In this paper we provide an experimental test of a Bertrand model, where firms move sequentially and the informational setting varies across different designs. Our experiment is composed of three treatments. In addition to demand and costs parameters, in the second and third treatments, subjects are also informed on the behaviour of players who are not directly operating in their own market. We find that the informational setting strongly affects behaviour and long run convergence to the market equilibrium.
2010
O'Higgins, S. N.; Sbriglia, Patrizia; Palomba, A.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11591/176027
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