In this paper we develop a competition model between a private firm and a partially privatised firm. If the two firms compete à la Cournot, the deriving value of the welfare is greater than that if the competition is between a private and a totally public firm, and between two private firms. Therefore, either the public ownership, or the privatization of the public monopoly are the best policy if the object of the government is the maximization of the welfare. We checked this hypothesis by analysing the privatization in the telecommunication market through data from 18 OECD Countries. The results confirm our hypothesis: the relationship between the welfare indicators (main lines per capita and total staff in TLC services) and the share of the government in the TLC incumbent is positive but not linear, that is, there is an optimal share of the government in the TLC incumbent.
Privatizzazione e Oligopoli misti: il caso delle Telecomunicazioni
BARALDI, Anna Laura
2003
Abstract
In this paper we develop a competition model between a private firm and a partially privatised firm. If the two firms compete à la Cournot, the deriving value of the welfare is greater than that if the competition is between a private and a totally public firm, and between two private firms. Therefore, either the public ownership, or the privatization of the public monopoly are the best policy if the object of the government is the maximization of the welfare. We checked this hypothesis by analysing the privatization in the telecommunication market through data from 18 OECD Countries. The results confirm our hypothesis: the relationship between the welfare indicators (main lines per capita and total staff in TLC services) and the share of the government in the TLC incumbent is positive but not linear, that is, there is an optimal share of the government in the TLC incumbent.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.